The Price raid started from Southern Arkansas. In General Kirby Smith's letter of directions to General Price, St. Louis was made the objective point, the enlistment of recruits the chief end, and the devastation of Kansas a special injunction.¹

The expedition entered Missouri from Pocahontas, Arkansas, and was met at Pilot Knob, Missouri, by General Thomas Ewing, Jr., of Kansas, and with an inferior force there detained until the attack on St. Louis became impracticable. At Franklin, Missouri, the raid turned in the direction of Kansas.

Major-General Samuel R. Curtis was in command of the Department of Kansas, with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth. In September, 1864, the frontier was threatened by Indians. In order to subdue them General Curtis had taken to the Plains every soldier the border could spare, and, leaving General Blunt to continue the campaign there, he returned. He reached his headquarters on the 17th of September, when he first learned of the approach of General Price. He saw the danger to Kansas. General Blunt was called in, and Governor Carney was induced to order out the Kansas militia. The campaigns for State and national elections were in active progress, and, seeing that the call for the militia was likely to produce little help because of that fact, General Curtis, on the 10th of October, placed Kansas under martial law; and on the same day he appointed as a member of his staff General James H. Lane, then United States Senator. On the 11th General Blunt arrived at Olathe and assumed command of the army, designated the Army of the Border. He found Kansas militia assembled to the number of twelve thousand (afterward increased to sixteen thousand) patriotic men anxious to battle to save the State from invasion. But political intrigue neutralized the support the militia stood ready to render and even made its presence a menace. Governor Carney owed his election to General Lane, but had fallen under the influence of Lane's political enemies, who were bitterly opposed to the re-election of President Lincoln. They exerted themselves to the utmost to embarrass and render futile every movement of the Union forces. In this crisis they came forward and denounced the demand for militia as a scheme originated by General Lane to take the citizens of Kansas out of the State and keep them beyond its borders until after the election. They pretended to believe these citizens were opposed to President Lincoln, that Lane knew it, and their absence in the field would enable him to carry the State for the President. Governor Carney controlled a newspaper, as did ex-Governor Robinson, and these papers ridiculed the possibility of the presence of General Price in Missouri.²

When it could no longer be denied that General Price was moving toward the Kansas border General Carney and his adherents insisted that the militia should not cross the State-line into Missouri, and that it should not be, subject to the orders of General Curtis, but should remain in Kansas and take orders only from Governor Carney and his officers.³

The appointment of General Blunt to the command of the Army of the Border was an incident favorable to Colonel Moonlight. He had been Blunt's chief-of-staff in 1862 and had great influence with him. On the 12th of October Moonlight sent Plumb the following dispatch:

Plumb, then Lieutenant-Colonel, did not escape the fate of the officer popular with his men, and jealousy of him was sometimes shown. He believed he saw in this dispatch an intention to ignore him as far as possible in the coining campaign. He sent General Blunt the following:

Blunt referred the matter to General Curtis; and Plumb was permitted to join his regiment, at the front, and was frequently in command of it during the campaign.

The brigades of the Army of the Border were formed at Hickman's Mills on the 15th of October. The Second Brigade was composed of the Eleventh Kansas, two companies of the Fifth Kansas, two companies of the Sixteenth Kansas, and four mountain howitzers. Colonel Moonlight was put in command of the brigade, and on the 16th marched to meet General Price and develop his position. Lexington was occupied on the 18th. All the forces of Price were rapidly concentrating in that region. As the Union officers were sitting down to dinner on the 19th Captain L. F. Green, Company B, Eleventh Kansas, entered and reported that he had just been driven in, and that Price's army was at hand. General Blunt, instantly ordered every officer to horse. It was not expected that the Confederate advance could long be checked at Lexington. Colonel Moonlight was given command of the rear. At midnight, after twelve hours of constant battle, the last stand was made at the crossing of the Sni, east of Wellington.⁶ At nine o'clock on the 20th General Blunt's forces took position on the west bank of the Little Blue River, eight miles northeast of Independence.

General Blunt wished to fight a decisive battle at the Little Blue, General Pleasanton was pressing Price's rear, and if Blunt could have had his way, the Confederate army might have been destroyed at the Little Blue. The plans of General Blunt could not be met, for Governor Carney and his politicians still insisted that General Price was not in Missouri at all, and that all the military movements of General Curtis were the result of Lane's scheming for political advantage. In fact, Governor Carney prepared a proclamation disbanding the militia the very day General Blunt formed his line along the Little Blue.⁷

Map of Battles of Little Blue, Big Blue & Westport

General Price did not reach the Little Blue until the morning of the 21st of October. Because of the attitude of Governor Carney, General Curtis did not intend that any general engagement should be fought there. The Eleventh Kansas had been left at the crossing with orders to detain the enemy as long as it could do so with safety, then burn the bridge and retire in the direction of Independence. Colonel Moonlight's resistance was much more stubborn than had been expected of him. He held the line as long as possible, setting the bridge on fire and falling back slowly only when Price's cavalry had appeared in force on both his flanks. At this juncture General Blunt came on the field with reinforcements and made an effort to halt the advance of General Price. A part of the field taken from Moonlight was regained. General Curtis and General Lane both went to the front, but Curtis was induced to return to Independence.

All that day Price was slowly pushing Blunt back, and it required almost his entire army to do it. General Blunt had but thirty-five hundred men of all arms - perhaps not so many. They hugged fences, sought skirts of timber, utilized ditches and highways, and stood behind stone walls. For some time the Eleventh Kansas was out of ammunition and held its position by defiant cheers.⁸ Two miles back from the Little Blue a stand was made at the Massey farm. There the Eleventh was fiercely attacked, lost a number of men, and Major Ross had a horse killed. While supplying the Major with another horse, Captain B. F. Simpson saw Plumb with a company of skirmishers far out in advance of the battle-line. A strong position was taken at the Saunders farm, three miles west of Massey's and this was held until night. From this point General Blunt sent Lane to Independence to tell Curtis that the Big Blue would have to be the line on the 22d.⁹ Late at night the Union forces crossed the Big Blue and took position in such defensive works as had been constructed there. The line extended south from the Missouri River to Hickman's Mills along the west bank of the Big Blue River, although the main body of the army covered a space of some six miles only.

In 1864 Byram's Ford, on what is now Sixty-first Street, Kansas City, was the principal crossing on the Big Blue. It was the most important point held by the Union army, and it should have been guarded by a good soldier. By the intrigues then distracting the councils of the Army of the Border, Colonel C. R. Jennison, Fifteenth Kansas, had secured command of the First Brigade, and he was put in command of the troops defending Byram's Ford on the morning of the 22d of October.¹⁰ About noon he was attacked by a heavy force, and before three o'clock he was driven back. and lost the key to the Union position. His failure to hold Byram's Ford lost the day to General Curtis, as its capture turned the right flank of his army, crushed the right wing and caused it to take a now position just outside of Kansas City. General Price camped on the south side of Brush Creek, a small stream running east a mile south of Westport.

The Eleventh Kansas was holding a ford above that guarded by Colonel Jennison. Seeing the Confederate army pouring through the gap made in the line by his defeat, and, knowing there was nothing to prevent its entering Kansas, Colonel Moonlight marched by double-quick to the State-line, south of Westport. There he formed to check the Confederate advance. Colonel Plumb, with four companies of the Eleventh Kansas, drove back Jackman's brigade, and did it in a manner that called forth compliments from all who saw it. It was dusk. In speaking of it many years later Colonel Moonlight said:

This charge was considered an event in the annals of the Eleventh Kansas, and is thus described by a Comrade of Colonel Plumb.¹²

Jackman's brigade was marching through the gap and had to be stopped else the Confederate army would pour over the State-line into Kansas. To check this advance was now the work of the Eleventh Kansas. The Confederates marched steadily northwest until they came in view of the Eleventh. At that instant Colonel Plumb with four companies was beginning his advance towards the rebels. Seeing this the Confederates stopped short and formed a line of battle facing Plumb, who took his men across the State-line to a little valley, and when his men were directly opposite the enemy, he halted them, faced about, formed his line and charged up the hill, his men cheering and firing at will after the first volley. The flashes of Plumb's guns were like fireflies on a damp night in summer. Jackman's brigade was swept from the field, and no further attempt was made by the enemy in that quarter.

The disaster to Colonel Veale's Regiment is best described in his official report:

General Curtis was greatly discouraged by the result of the battle of the Big Blue; it proved that little of the Kansas militia would be permitted by Governor Carney and his advisers to fight under Federal officers.

In the hope that he might secure better results by fighting on Kansas soil Curtis decided in the afternoon of the 22d to retire across the Kansas River at night; and he then sent his ammunition and supply trains to Wyandotte, now Kansas City, Kansas. Later he crossed the line himself ¹³ and was found in camp six miles west of Wyandotte. From this point he was prevailed on to return late at night to Kansas City for a council of war with his officers. This council opposed the retreat into Kansas, as it meant for one thing that Kansas City would be looted if not sacked; but General Curtis held out long for that action. He was not so much to blame. He had about four thousand volunteer troops and some sixteen thousand Kansas militia, the latter so hampered that it had been able to render little service. The fighting had been done principally by the volunteers. He had no hope of better results in future fighting with the militia officers acting independently of his orders, each regiment for itself. That afternoon Colonel Sandy Lowe, Twenty-first Militia, had stood by and seen Colonel Veale's regiment cut to pieces, not daring to aid his fellow-officer in the absence of express orders. The politicians about Governor Carney were urging General Curtis to fall back into Kansas, promising active support if he would do so. Curtis was an old man. He was loyal and patriotic, but the incessant intrigue of Carney and his associates had told on him. He did not believe his little force of volunteer troops could hold Price in check, and he counted very little on the militia outside of Kansas. If he had asserted himself, suppressed the Kansas politicians, and assumed vigorous command of the militia he could have defeated Price. He knew this, and also knew that he had a perfect right to do it, martial law being in effect and the laws of Kansas suspended. But he could not bring himself to the point of resisting Governor Carney.

The first decision of the council of war was to retreat, but General Curtis was finally prevailed on to stand his ground and have his trains return from Wyandotte. This result was not reached, however, until it had been decided by the officers to arrest General Curtis and put General Blunt in command of the army.

When the movements of the following day had been determined by the council it was dissolved. Then Carney and his advisers fell on General Curtis with such vigor that he promised them he would retreat into Kansas early Sunday morning; and he actually went to Westport to order the retreat. He found the battle in progress. General Blunt would not order a retreat with the troops under fire, and General Curtis did not do so. The co-operation of the greater part of the militia was lost, though it was anxious to a man to go into battle, those who secured the opportunity doing good service, demonstrating that victories rather than defeats could have been won had Governor Carney and his politicians been suppressed early in the campaign.

The attack on Price on Sunday was without much order and unity of action. About noon General Pleasanton arrived on the field in the rear of the Confederate army, and had General Curtis made the proper effort General Price's army could have been destroyed. When Price turned to retreat and the day was won Governor Carney and his militia officers became very enthusiastic and displayed great anxiety for the battle.

The Eleventh Kansas had been issued rations and ammunition early Sunday morning; for late Saturday night Captain B. F. Simpson had placed a cocked pistol at the ear of a disloyal pilot and forced him to take a boat to Wyandotte and bring a cargo of supplies for that purpose, before the return of the trains to the Missouri side. The position of the Eleventh on Sunday was on the extreme right of the Army of the Border, South of Westport, where it pushed a rebel force rapidly down the Stateline road; but it was not properly supported. Colonel Moonlight sounded the recall for Colonel Plumb, who was far in the advance with his men. If the Eleventh had been supported it would have been exactly opposite General Pleasanton when he came on the field, and the Confederate army would have been within the Union lines with escape very difficult, if not impossible.

With the appearance of Pleasanton the spell of stupidity was broken. Relieved of the incubus of Governor Carney and his advisers, General Curtis showed some of his old-time spirit. The Eleventh was thrown forward to keep abreast of Price's army to prevent the entrance into Kansas of any part of it on the retreat. This it accomplished as to the towns. It saved Mound City after a severe engagement and it reached Fort Scott only a few minutes ahead of a Confederate force sent to destroy it. As the Eleventh entered the town it was met by the people and received with cheers. "The Star Spangled Banner" was sung as the Old Flag was borne into the public square.

The Eleventh was in pursuit of Price to the Arkansas River. From Fort Smith it returned to Kansas through the Ozark Mountains of Northwest Arkansas. At Fort Smith the horses had broken into a cane-brake; eating the hard stalks of cane caused the death of some two hundred and fifty of them; and this number of men were compelled to march on foot. There was much rain and wet snow to march through. The country had been stripped by the Confederates on their retreat and supplied little for man or beast. Horses died on the road, thus constantly augmenting the column marching on foot. Colonel Plumb fared no better than his men, but he cheered and encouraged them. The first service of the Eleventh had been in this rugged region in 1862, and this march was a repetition of the hard experience of those days.

The regiment arrived at Paola, December 12, after a campaign of exactly two months.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME 1 & 2
BIOGRAPHIES — VOLUMES 3, 4, & 5
A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | Y | Z

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